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Re-shaping the Common Good in
Times of Public Health Emergencies:
Validating Medical Triage
George P. Smith, II*
It is widely believed that anything done in the public interest is good for
society and good for the individual members of society. When the
'anything' involves the health of the people, the belief is rapidly
1
converted to doctrine. Doctrine nowadays means law.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

There are three major categories of emergencies: (1) those arising from
"grave political crises," such as terrorist attacks and armed international
conflicts; (2) those resulting from economic events, such as the Great
Depression; and (3) those born out of natural disasters, such as Hurricane
Katrina, and wider "force majeure" events such as strikes.2 It has been
noted, correctly, that modem society faces dangers comparable to those the
Nation was forced to deal with at the beginning of World War II.3 Today,
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1. Theodore Cooper, Shattuck Lecture - In the Public Interest, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1185, 1185 (1979).
2. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1025 n.44 (2003).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 3 (2006) [hereinafter POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT]. See Bernadette
Meyler, Economic Emergency and The Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 539 (2007), for an
excellent analysis of economic emergencies and states of political emergency. See generally
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure,92 VA. L. REV.
1091 (2006) for an analysis recounting the governmental response to historical public
emergencies, and suggesting increased judicial deference as a mechanism to improve
response in modem-day emergencies.
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therefore, emergencies
of one kind or another have almost become the
"coin of the realm.",4
In emergencies of any character, the Nation's survival is imperiled and
the Executive Branch must act to preserve the social order.5 Also, it has
been argued that the Executive has a "penumbra of powers" in excess of
those enumerated in Article II of the Constitution which allows him to act
decisively in times of emergency. 6 Of utmost concern to civil libertarians,
with regard to the execution of these powers, is that individual liberties or
civil rights-particularly minority interests of an ethnic, ideological or
political character-will be subject to abuse, compromise, or even total
abrogation. 7
As early as 1824, the United States Supreme Court recognized the power
of the states to compel isolation and quarantine. 8 In 1905, the Court
determined in Jacobson v. Massachusetts that citizens are subject to certain

4. This phrase is adapted from its original Old English usage to illustrate that
emergencies are now quite common. Compare 1512, 4 HEN. 8, c. 19 § 14 (acknowledging
"[s]ilver and prente of the coigne of this realme"), with The Cambridge History of English
and American Literature (A.W. Ward & A. R. Waller eds., bartleby.com 2000),
http://www.bartleby.com/217/1112.html ("Shakespeare, Fletcher, Jonson, Spenser, had
imposed themselves on criticism; and criticism grew rich (as it always does) by accepting
and passing these great poets as current coin of the realm."). See KENNETH R. WING, ET AL.,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (2007), for reference citations to past emergencies as well as ongoing
ones, such as HIV/AIDS and terrorism.
5. Meyler, supra note 3, at 541-43. See WING, supra note 4, where the authors present
and analyze the past epidemics of cholera in 1832, 1849, and 1866, id. at 1, wider epidemics,
id. at 152-53, tuberculosis, id. at 153 passim, HIV/AIDS, id. at 188 passim, Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), id. at 199 passim, influenza in 1918-19, id. at 217 passim,
and bioterrorism, etc., id. at 234 passim. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:
RISK AND RESPONSE 247 (2004) (noting the Black Death as one of the most horrific
pandemics in history as it dissipated a significant part of the European population).
6. Meyler, supra note 3, at 548-49; see, e.g., Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance (Stafford) Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)
(conferring broad powers upon the President in times of domestic emergencies). But see
Mark V. Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in AT WAR WITH CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 177-78 (Thomas E. Baker & John F. Stack, Jr., eds., 2006)
(presenting three positions on American constitutionalism during wartime, one of which
suggests that the Constitution's general standards should be applied).
7. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 296 (2003); POSNER, NOT
A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 3, at 3. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Posneron Security and
Liberty: Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (2007)
(analyzing Judge Richard Posner's judicial philosophy in two momentous decisions:
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago (Alliance I), 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984)
(en banc), Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago (Alliance II), 237 F.3d 799 (7th
Cir. 2001).
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824). In assessing the extent of
federal power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the Court held (as to the
licensing of vessels on waters within the jurisdiction of New York) that "[i]nspection laws,
quarantine laws, health laws of every description" are within the Commerce Clause powers
of Congress. Id.
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laws which promote public health and safety for the benefit of the common
good.9

Since that time, public health ethics (unlike bioethics, which stresses
non-malfeasance as one of the cornerstones of individual health care
decisions)' 0 requires inherently at-risk individuals to suffer elements of
harm-through isolation, quarantine, or compulsory vaccination-in order
to advance the public good and secure the public-at-large from exposure to
the spread of an infectious disease."
Therefore, it is reasoned that individual inconvenience or sacrifice is
12
minimal when compared with the communal benefits of health and safety.
Accordingly, under this health care management and decision-making
model, the government seeks to balance individual liberty interests and
rights against the communal benefits which may result from a limitation or
restriction of those liberties. Typically, this balancing of individual rights
does not outweigh community health benefits.13
When public health strategies are in place to deal with emergencies or
pandemics, there is, perhaps, always a fear-if not a risk-that a police
state could develop.

This fear develops among the public because

unnecessarily broad and arbitrary powers are conferred upon health
officials with uneven levels of accountability. 14 While the government may

limit personal freedoms in times of national emergencies, it must never

9. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-27 (1905).
10. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 4 (5th ed.
2004).
11.
LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 13 (2002).
12. Id.
13. Id. Balancing tests are utilized in other areas of law as well; for example, the costbenefit test is foundational to nuisance law. See George P. Smith, II, The Morphogenesisof
an HistoricalRevisionist Theory of ContemporaryEconomic Jurisprudence,74 NEB. L. REV.
658, 698 passim (1995). In public health governance law, the protection of a population's
health is balanced against other policy objectives, normative values, and interests. After
establishing that the public health action being advocated has a valid epidemiological and
scientific basis, the proposed action should be tested by the principle of non-discrimination
and the "least restrictive measure" test. Accordingly, healthcare measures that will interfere
in an unreasonable manner with the public's pursuit and exercise of liberties or rights must
be executed in reasonable ways which minimize such interferences, and are not seen as acts
of invidious discrimination. Finding a point of equilibrium between these two policy
objectives which, in turn, do not compromise legitimate efforts to advance and protect
population health, is vexatious and, indeed, problematic. David P. Fidler, Global Health
Jurisprudence:A Time ofReckoning, 96 GEO. L.J. 393,402-03 (2008).
14. George J. Annas, Bioterrorism,Public Health and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1337, 1338, 1341 (2002) [hereinafter Annas, NEW ENG. J. MED.]. But see POSNER,
NOT A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 3, at 5 (acknowledging concerns of restrictions on civil

liberties and a climate of fear created as a consequence of government actions during
emergencies, but dismissing them largely as but inevitable by-products of such emergency
powers). See generally George J. Annas, Terrorism and Human Rights, in INTHE WAKE OF
TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORALITY INA TIME OF CRISIS 34 (Jonathan D. Moreno ed., 2003).
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disregard-nor abrogate-those freedoms without a set time frame for their
reinstatement at the conclusion of the crisis.
Civil libertarians have asserted that in times of emergency, the courts, in
exercising their powers of judicial review, should set stricter standards of
review for governmental actions that go too far by reducing "the liberties of
minorities while providing too much security to the public. 15 They point
to the 1938 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., which outlines the framework, or mechanism, for protection of these
minority and marginal voices. 16 The central issue in Carolene was whether
the Commerce Clause grants Congress the right to regulate filled milk
under the Filled Milk Act of 1923."7 Elevating the Court's holding-more
particularly footnote four within the opinion-to a level of "sanctification"
by those intent on curtailing the emergency powers of the state, simply tests
the limits of credulity.18 The argument is thus advanced that where laws
target minorities, the courts should declare a clear preference for general
laws as opposed to targeted laws-because general laws "require the self'1 9
interested majority to internalize costs."
Civil libertarians overlook the notion that, taken in isolation, virtually all
laws "harm"-to some degree-a minority population. 20 Accordingly, the
application of Carolene should be limited to situations where a "discrete
and insular minorit[y]" has been historically oppressed as a consequence of
prejudice. 21 As such, Carolene becomes a faulty template for advancing the
view that emergency powers exercised by the government must be subject
to strict scrutiny because laws promulgated thereunder would have a
discriminatory effect upon certain minorities. The discriminatory effect,
stemming principally from isolation or quarantine that necessarily occurs
when any emergency powers are exercised, is no more disproportionate to
the groups historically discriminated against than to other socio-ethnic
groupings within contemporary society that also have been victims of
15.
16.
17.
18.

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1107.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 152, n.4. In footnote 4, Justice Stone writes, in part:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, it is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.... Nor need we consider whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious ... national ... or
racial minorities ....
Id. (citations omitted).
19. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1115. See generally GRIFFIN TROTTER, THE
ETHICS OF COERCION IN MASS CASUALTY MEDICINE (2007).
20. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1115-16.
21. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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discrimination.22 The unfortunate historical oppression of one group should
be neither pivotal nor determinative of the validity of constitutional powers
exercised during public health emergencies in order to safeguard the
common good.
Today, when the government claims emergency powers in times of
disaster, it is most generally justified in doing so under the rubric of the
inherent powers of states to advance and maintain the common good
through the exercise of their broad police powers.2 3 Such broad police
powers are, by their nature, "free from principled constraint. '' 24 In times of
national emergencies, the judiciary must make careful efforts to maintain
constitutional integrity in the decision-making process-an integrity upheld
by a ready willingness to find a "balance between the interest in liberty
from government restraint or interference and the interest in public
safety. '' 25 Thus, of necessity, the point of equilibrium must shift as threats
to the common good intensify and subsequently abate over the course of
time.26
Ideally, the point of balance to test the limits of a right, and the point at
which it may be re-calibrated, is "the point at which a slight expansion in
the scope of the right would subtract more from public safety than it would
add to personal liberty and a slight contraction would subtract more from
personal liberty than it would add to public safety. 27 Not only do the
weights placed upon the various competing values become crucial in
reaching the optimal point of balance between liberty and security interests,
but the effects of these weights on the actual values of the safety measures
being challenged are as significant, if not definitive. 28 The absolute need
for a point of balance was articulated in 1949 by Justice Robert H. Jackson

22. Id. at 144. See generally Symposium, Women and Children Last? Feminist
Perspectives on DisasterRelief and Recovery, 24 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 1 (2007) (providing

insight to discrimination during national disaster recovery and the significant issues that
women face during relief efforts).
23. Meyler, supra note 3, at 549-50.
24. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 180 (2005).
25.
POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 3, at 31.

26.

See id.

27. Id.; see also Sharona Hoffman, Responders' Responsibility: Liability and Immunity
in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1919-24 (2008) (analyzing the
weaknesses of the present theories of liability and sources of immunity for health emergency

responders to public health emergencies, and proposing that a comprehensive immunity
provision be incorporated into both federal and state laws which would, in turn, seek to
codify a balancing point between the needs of disaster victims with the needs of the
emergency responders and the interests that promote and safeguard the common good).
28.

POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 3, at 32-33.
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of the U.S. Supreme
Court when he cautioned that the Constitution is not a
29
"suicide pact.,

Part II of this Article discusses competing conceptions of the common
good and posits that a new philosophy is required in public health
emergencies. The goal of this new philosophy is to promote unambiguous
and balanced normative standards for conduct that are necessary for
consensus-based decision-making in times of emergency.
In Part III, this Article tests the extent to which public health
emergencies necessitate a reinterpretation or reshaping of the common
good 30 and concludes that such emergencies usually do necessitate such a
reinterpretation or reshaping. 31 Next, this Article analyzes the extent to
which the medical principle of triage is a relevant construct for allocating
scarce medical resources during contemporary public health emergencies. 32
Part IV tests the efficacy or "codification" of this construct by applying it to
The National Strategy of Pandemic Influenza, 33 and more particularly, to
the plan for its execution developed by the Department of Health and
Human Services. 34 It will be shown that under the rubric of cost-benefit
29. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There is a
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it
will revert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
30. See generally RICHARD A.EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD (2002) (positing that concern with the
common good both authorizes state action and hems it in, and it need not abrogate
protections of individual liberty and private property); Robert J. Lipken, The Quest for The
Common Good: Neutrality and Deliberative Democracy in Sunstein's Conception of
American Constitutionalism, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1039 (1994) (critiquing Sunstein's
conception of deliberative democracy and suggesting that the ideal of governmental
neutrality-legislation that does not favor one private actor over another-can be modified if
such modifications are made with an eye toward promoting the common good while
preserving the principles of capitalism).
31. POSNER,NOT A SUICIDE PACT,supra note 3,at 47; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3,
at 1094, 1115-21.
32. Compare George P. Smith, II, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP.HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 143, 145-47 (1985) [hereinafter Smith, Endgame Realities] (discussing the
compromises inherent to the distribution and allocation of scarce medical resources), with
James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies and Disasters, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 630-631 (2006) (discussing the myriad legal issues that arise during
public health emergencies, and how the prioritization and distribution of legal resources
affect the efficacy of public health response efforts). Hodge defines legal triage-the
counterpoint to medical triage-as efforts, during emergencies, to prioritize the vast array of
unscripted, developing legal issues, (e.g., isolation, quarantine, and forced immunization)
which arise and thereby seek an expeditious and legitimate response to the immediate
emergency. Id.
33. HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
(2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL
STRATEGY].
34. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN pt. 1,
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analysis, triage is, indeed, a contemporary tool for distributing scarce
medical resources, and therefore embodies a correct use of utilitarian
philosophy.35
Part V considers two model legislative proposals-the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) 36 and The Turning Point Model
State Public Health Act (Turning Point Act)37-to further test the validity of

triage.38 In Part VI, the ultimate conclusion reached is that the ideal of
attaining a level of Distributive Justice when allocating scarce medical
resources has been achieved in the past,39 using triage, and can continue to
be met today in times of public health emergencies by its incorporation into
federal policy-making instruments, as well as model state legislative
proposals.
II. THE COMMON GOOD

The common good is often seen as a utilitarian ideal of attaining the
greatest possible good for the greatest number of individuals,4 ° or
alternatively, as a complex collective of four notions: aggregative,
common-common, supersessive, and integral. 4' Maritain thought of the

available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemiclnfluenzaPlan.pdf
[hereinafter HHS PLAN].
35.

See discussion infra Part IV.

See generally NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, BENTHAM'S

THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE (1978).

36. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law & the Public's
Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., Proposed Official Draft 2001),
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
37.

TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT (Pub. Health Stat. Modernization

2003),
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/improving/
Nat'l
Excellence
Collaborative
turningpoint/PDFsiMSPHAweb.pdf.
38. See generally Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health
Emergencies: Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act,
19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379 (2003) (analyzing the MSEHPA as a framework for
states to modernize public health laws, but suggesting that significant alterations are
necessary before ultimate adoption in order to protect privacy and civil liberty concerns
during large scale public health emergencies).
39. See George P. Smith, II, Distributive Justice and Health Care, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 421, 426-30 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, DistributiveJustice].
40. See Jeremy Bentham, Excerpt on the Phrase "Greatest Happiness of the Greatest
Number," in THE CLASSICAL UTILITARIANS: BENTHAM AND MILL 92, 92 (John Troyer ed.,
2003); GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 372-73 (1986).
41. Daniel P. Sulmasy, Four Basic Notions of the Common Good, 75 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
303, 303-07 (2001). Under the aggregative approach, the common good is seen as the
aggregate of all the goods of all individuals in a particular social grouping. Id. at 304.
Common good are the goods all citizens hold in common. Id. The supersessive common
good is seen as a good which overrides all the individuals comprising a community (with
collective security no doubt being such a good). Id. at 305-06. The integral common good
derives from mutual human interaction. Id. at 306.
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Surely, Rawls would

have seen the common good as but a set of conditions allowing man to live
under his own autonomous direction and finish his "projects" of choice,
since there is no good held in common.43 Classically, the common good is
viewed as embracing the community and its institutions as they serve the
good of all citizens, and not the limited or restricted goods of particular
rulers or classes. 4 The human good, or the good for human beings, is
rooted in the notion that man is both a rational and a political animal.45
If, as Hegel posits, the norms and the values of ethical life form the very
essence of the common good, that good must therefore be seen as
derivative of "conditions of rationality" found within a particular system or
set of values of a given society. 46 Accordingly, determining what may be in
the common good must be tied to testing the extent to which "currently
shared values stipulate" an action to be inclusive.47 Individual judgments
are thus inconsequential. Rooted in the school of conservative relativism,
Hegel's position holds that individuals must respect prevailing social
values. 48 Indeed, when "questions of right" arise, they must be resolved
"by recourse to prevailing values," rather than individual judgment.49
Hegel further postures that within each community, there is "a dominant
mode of self-reflection" or, "a self-image" which, in turn, "is embodied in a
particular structure of norms and values. 5 ° Competing ideologies within
any given society merely result in differing self-images. 51
A new
philosophy regarding public health emergencies is needed; society should
not continue to accept the common good as but a course of action set by
one autonomous social group, since such a course would discount or

42.

Glenn N. Schram, Pluralism and the Common Good, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 119, 119

(1991) (analyzing, principally, the works of Jacques Maritain).
43.
44.

Sulmasy, supra note 41, at 307.
V. Bradley Lewis, The Common Good in ClassicalPoliticalPhilosophy, CURRENT
ISSUES IN CATH. HIGHER EDUC., Winter 2006, at 25, 27.
45. Id. at 25-26. Common sense helps define the applicable borders of the common
good. See generally Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common
Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REv. 289, 307 (2007).

46. A. S. Walton, Hegel, Utilitarianism,and the Common Good, 93 ETHICS 753, 766
(1983).
47.
48.

Id.
Id.

49. Id. Conservative relativism determines what is in the common good by ascertaining
"that which currently shared values stipulate as being so." Accordingly, this view supports
the proposition that individual judgment has no relevance in the shared values of the
common good. Id. at 766. See also 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

2535 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993) (defining "relativism" as "a doctrine or theory which holds
knowledge, truth, and morality are relative and not absolute").
50. Walton, supra note 46, at 767.
51

Id
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completely disregard ideological conflicts. 5 2

This new philosophy must

recognize that competing disagreements of the common good can only be
resolved satisfactorily "through a reconsideration of the language of which
they are expressions., 53 Ideally, this philosophy will spawn a new and
informed level of debate, which will ultimately spur the emergence of
legislative frameworks for consensus-based decision-making that sets
unambiguous and balanced normative standards for conduct.
III. TRIAGE: VALIDATING THE BALANCING TEST AS A TOOL FOR
ALLOCATING SCARCE HEALTHCARE RESOURCES

A. Origins of the Modern Triage System
Because of the limited resources and the limited surge capacity of the
health care system, a pandemic raises an unavoidable reference to-and
dependence upon-the principle of triage.4 Triage is a French word which
means "sorting, picking, grading or selecting according to quality., 55 As
early as 1717, triage was applied in the English language to denote the
separation of wool and coffee beans according to quality. 56 Coffee beans
were separated into three classes: best quality, middling and triage-the
lowest grade. 57 Today, triage is defined as:
The medical screening of patients to determine their priority for
treatment; the separation of a large number of casualties, in military or
civilian disaster medical care, into three groups: those who cannot be
expected to survive even with treatment, those who will recover without
and the priority group of those who need treatment in order to
treatment,
58
survive.

Modem medical triage developed from the military system.59
Napoleon's chief surgeon, Baron Dominique Jean Larrey, was the first to

52. See id. at 768.
53. Id. at 771.
54.

James F. Childress, Triage in Response to a BioterroristAttack, in IN THE

WAKE OF

TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORALITY INA TIME OF CRISIS 77 (Jonathan D. Moreno, ed., 2003).

55. Id. at 78; see also Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 144.
56. Childress, supra note 54, at 78; see also Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at
144.
57. Childress, supra note 54, at 78; see also Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at
144.
58. Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 144 (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1476 (W. Corsette ed., 4th unabridged law's. ed. 1976)).
59. Mary Faith Marshall & Martin Perlmutter, The Construction of Ethics and Its
Reconstruction in Critical Care: Ethical Theory and Practice,in ETHICS INCRITICAL CARE
MEDICINE 34 (James P. Orlowski ed., 1999).
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introduce triage as a concept for medical treatment. 60 Barron Larrey
developed a system for removing soldiers from the battlefield which used
then-novel selection criteria-not the soldier's rank (which was formerly
the practice)-but rather the severity of the soldier's injury.6 I His goal was
to provide efficient medical services.62 As a result, he sorted casualties
based on medical need: those most severely wounded received the highest
priority, while those least severely injured waited to receive medical
attention.6 3 At that time, the concern was to conserve the scarce medical
resources; specifically, the time and energy of medical personnel.64
Concurrently, the ultimate objective was a speedy restoration of the fighting
function. 65 The most "salvageable" were deemed those who could be
rehabilitated in order to return to fight another day and thereby preserve the
common good.66 Before French triage, the wounded remained on the
battlefield where they fell and would only be gathered and evaluated at the
conclusion of battle-if even alive-and only then would they be sent to
67
hospitals.
During the United States Civil War, wounded soldiers were treated
without regard to the type and severity of their condition. 68 In World War I,
the United States took an example from the French and British armies by
creating a sorting station for wounded soldiers and adopting the term
triage.69 World War I ambulance drivers devised a system of prioritizing in
which wounded soldiers would be treated first, with the determinative
selection factor being whether the soldier could easily be returned to
battle. 70 Those who could not be returned to the battlefield were treated
last, and some were even left to die. 71 The problem was that insufficient
numbers of health care workers and medical facilities prevented
simultaneous treatment of the wounded; consequently, difficult choices
were made and some soldiers had to wait-or even pay the ultimate price. 72

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Smith Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 144.
Id.
Id.
ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE NEW MEDICINE AND THE OLD
See id.

ETHICS

45 (1990).

67. David E. Hogan & Julio Raphael Lairet, Triage, in DISASTER MEDICINE 12, 12
(David E. Hogan & Jonathan L. Burstein eds., 2007).
68. Childress, supra note 54, at 78; see also Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at
144.
69. Childress, supra note 54, at 78.
70. MILTON D. HEIFETZ, ETHICS IN MEDICINE 197 (1996).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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In essence, the soldiers were treated under the "doctrine of common
good," where winning the war was the top priority.7 3 Accordingly, those74
who could not return to the battlefield were lower on the priority list.
Therefore, the military triage systems developed a utilitarian approach in
which soldiers who needed limited treatment, and readily could be returned
to battle, were given a higher priority while those with life-threatening
wounds were given a lower priority. 75 According to the U.S. military
policy, the purpose of triage-sorting is to evaluate and classify casualties
for treatment and evacuation to accomplish 76"the greatest good for the
greatest number of wounded and injured men.
The military triage system, which began during World War I, has
continued to develop and now governs the treatment of many patients in
U.S. hospitals. Thus, patients presenting in a hospital emergency room are
evaluated according to their medical condition and needs; in other words,
the extent to which their injuries are life-threatening, urgent, semi-urgent or
in need of no care, and the likely outcome resulting from medical
intervention. 8 Since healthcare workers are unable to treat everyone
simultaneously, and medical resources are limited, triage allows (as
discussed) for the actual rationing of these medical resources to "produce
the greatest good for the greatest number by meeting human needs most
effectively and efficiently under conditions of scarcity. ' 79 Triage relies on
the utilitarian rationale and goal of achieving the maximum amount of
good. s In a purely utilitarian approach, actions are judged based on their
benefits and whether they provide maximum utility to the general welfare,
with little or no regard for moral rights.81 Moral questions may, indeed, be
seen as inappropriate because in contemporary society, immorality governs
interpersonal actions and is seen as a quality of personhood.82

73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Marshall & Perlmutter, supra note 59, at 34.

76.

Childress, supra note 54, at 79 (quoting

DOUGLAS A. RUND & TONDRA S. RAUSCH,
9 (1980)).
77. Id.
78. Childress, supra note 54, at 79; see also Marshall & Perlmutter, supra note 59, at 35
("The severity of an individual's illness, or need, is generally tempered by survivability or
chance of a successful outcome.").
79. Childress, supra note 54, at 79.
80. Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 146-47.
81. Id. at 147.
82. DUBBER, supra note 24, at 180.
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B. ContemporaryApplications
Disaster triage is "a dynamic process of rapid evaluation and frequent
reassessment of casualties presenting for evaluation."8 3 The practice of
disaster triage-especially at the pre-hospital or field stage-is admittedly,
on consensus opinion, an inexact science,84 or stated simply, a
determination of what best preserves the "common good., 85 Although
inextricably linked to utilitarianism, the philosophy of disaster triage-it is
asserted-must be grounded in measurable or objective criteria by which a
correct assessment is made of a victim's medical condition, instead of
evaluating triage's use or non-use based on the achievement of the
"greatest good., 86 Efforts to standardize this level of triage in the field
87
have proven difficult.
One significant attempt at standardization was developed in California in
1983 and designated as Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START).88
START, updated in 1994, is the most commonly used triage methodology
in the United States. 89 It identifies, within one hour of a victim's trauma,
three conditions which-if not treated-may lead to death: impaired
breathing, head injury, and severe hemorrhage. 90 START is not designed
for scenarios involving biological, chemical, or nuclear emergencies, and is
faulted for its lack of differentiation regarding trauma types and estimations
of prognosis or probability. 9' Another triage system has been developed in
recent years to allow for rapid treatment during disasters: Move, Assess,
Sort and Send (MASS). 92 Critical care decisions have yet to be tested fully
under this operational system; 93 but it nonetheless is a positive indication of
re-assessment and openness to change.
83.
84.

Hogan & Lairet, supra note 67, at 27.
Id. at 26-27.
85. JONSEN, supra note 65, at 45.
86. Hogan & Lairet, supra note 67, at 17, 19.
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Hogan & Lairet, supra note 67, at 25-26. Another set of recommendations for
patient treatment during a flu pandemic or other incidents involving mass casualties was
issued in January, 2007. The Task Force for Mass Critical Care-a multidisciplinary and
governmental group working under the Critical Care Collaborative Initiative-has offered
proposals which resemble a battlefield triage approach in which, essentially, scarce health
care resources are reserved for those most likely to survive. Triage teams in hospitals would
determine those at high risk of death and very diminished chances of long term survival
(including people 85 years of age or older). See Asha Devereaux et al., Summary of
Suggestionsfrom the Task Forcefor Mass Critical Care Summit, January26-27, 2007, 133
CHEST (May Supp.) IS (2008).
93. Hogan & Lairet, supra note 67, at 26.
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C. Criticism and Disappointments

One critic of the triage system has opined that, today, the whole process
for its use has been reversed-those with the most serious conditions are
seen, evaluated and attended to first while the "merely mutilated," or
salvageable, are forced to wait. 94 That certainly appeared to be the
situation, in very large part, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. At one
staging center, those found to be in "[direct] need of medical attention"
were rushed by ambulance to medical facilities in Baton Rouge, while those
"in the best shape" were sent to Thibodaux some sixty minutes outside of
New Orleans and sheltered in a gymnasium. 95 In retrospect, this was the
most humane and reasonable policy to follow. But, in one particular case,
tragic consequences flowed from its adoption. Because of this triage
practice in New Orleans, a physician and two nurses at one particular
hospital-Memorial Medical Center-were charged with "mercy killing"
for injecting four patients with lethal doses of a combination of morphine
and midazolam.96 The injections were apparently ordered as a result of a
triage ranking that found these patients-not considered in imminent
danger of dying-nonetheless incapable of sustaining themselves without
considerable pain or anxiety for a protracted period in the hospital before
being evacuated. 97 Inside the hospital itself, some 250 patients were
trapped and unable to be transferred; thus, they were subjected to a facility
where temperatures were extreme and neither electricity nor waste disposal
was available. 98 None of the four patients had, incidentally, asked for
assistance in euthanizing themselves. 99 Subsequently, the prosecutor
dropped the charges against the nurses,100 and a Grand Jury refused to indict
the physician; yet three of the four patients' families filed civil actions
against her. 10 '

94. JONSEN, supra note 65, at 46.
95. Tamer EI-Ghobashy, Homeless and Haunted. Triage Center Full of Misery, DAILY
NEWS (New York), Aug. 31, 2005, at 7; see also Felicity Barringer & Donald G. McNeil Jr.,
Grim Triage for Ailing and Dying at a Makeshift Airport Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,

2005, at A13 (describing the dire situation at the Louis Armstrong International Airport
which served as a triage center and hospital in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
96. Cf Tyler J. Curiel, Murder or Mercy? HurricaneKatrina and the Needfor Disaster
Training, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2067 (2006) (suggesting that healthcare providers need

better
97.
98.
99.

training to make competent provision of care decisions during disasters).
Id. at 2067.
Id. at 2067-68.
Id. at 2068.

100. Mary Foster, Prosecutor Drops Case Against 2 Nurses in Four Post-Katrina
Deaths, WASH. POST, July 4, 2007, at A7.
101.
Adam Nossiter, GrandJury Won't Indict Doctor in HurricaneDeaths, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 2007, at A 10.
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D. A Modified UtilitarianApproach Through
the Principleof DistributiveJustice

Because of the synergy of public health with human rights and the
defense of individual rights and dignity, together with the recognition of the
health of the greater community, a purely utilitarian approach to triage will
not be adequate. °2 The utilitarian ethical theory as developed by Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill is, as seen, the principle of the greatest
happiness and actions that promote the greatest happiness are of most utility
and are considered right. 10 3 However, a major objection to utilitarianism is
that, as a society, certain acts are valued because they are fair and just and
not because they maximize happiness. 0 4 A concern is that the utilitarian
principle of the "greatest happiness for the greatest number of people"
sacrifices some members of society to serve the happiness of the
majority.0 5
An alternative decision model has been suggested which would be
applicable to the response strategies to pandemics. Under this model,
decisions would be made "in a rational manner and guided by a spirit of
humanism which minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social
good of each situation, a humane standard of justice 0will
be achieved and
6
triage will operate as a complement to its attainment."'
The principle of distributive justice requires that benefits and burdens
ought to be distributed equitably, that resources ought to be allocated fairly,
and that one ought to act in such a manner that no one person or group
bears a disproportionate share of benefits or burdens. 107 A stockpile of
countermeasures raises, in particular, two questions: in what order will
citizens or patients receive these medical resources, and who will make the
decision of how to allocate them?108 This is a matter of distributive justice
and would require the government to make very difficult decisions and to
list, in order of priority, who is to receive these resources first and who
must wait.
This prioritization of citizens for the distribution of medical resources
seems harsh, and some may argue that patients should be provided
treatment on a first-come-first-served basis or on a random selection
102.
103.
104.

GOSTIN, supra note 11, at 97.
FURROW ET AL., supra note 10, at 8.
Id.at 11.

105. Id.
106. Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 149; see also Smith, Distributive
Justice, supra note 39, at 428-30 (suggesting that fair procedures for health care rationing
must be shaped by the goal of humane care which reduces suffering, enhances the common
good, and safeguards the dignity of the human spirit).
107. Smith, DistributiveJustice, supra note 39, at 421 passim.
108. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAw 47 (1993).
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principle-based on chance-or based on the idea that no one should be
given priority, since if all cannot be saved, then no one should be saved.10 9
These are the three core principles of an egalitarian approach that attempts
10
to promote equality among persons who require a scarce resource.
Because of the chaos a pandemic is likely to bring, a strategy that focuses
on benefiting society at large is a useful one, however, it must also be
"guided by a spirit of humanism" and not eliminate autonomy altogether in
the process.111
In a pandemic, the influx of diseased or at-risk individuals will cause a
surge on the health care system, inevitably raising the question of whether
triage and rationing of scarce medical resources is unethical, unfair, and
unjust."l 2 The health care system will "face opposing moral obligations: to
provide [good] health care and at the same time to protect the fabric of
society. ' 'l l3 During a dire situation like a pandemic, with thousands of
citizens becoming stricken with a deadly influenza virus, rationing health
care and medical resources will not only be necessary, but it will be just if
applied correctly.'1 4 Because a large scale pandemic requires the
distribution of health care and medical resources for the greater society,
difficult choices will have to be made to determine who will receive certain
kinds of care and treatment.1 15 Health care practitioners will be forced to
make difficult decisions in the way of "patient selection" for treatment and
care, while refusing treatment to others."16 Triage will be the tool used for
patient selection," 7 which also will provide a method for just distribution of
scarce medical resources.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 147.
Id.
Id.
Childress, supra note 54, at 77.
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 38 (1986).
114. Id. at 38-39 ("[M]orally valid criteria can be established for both allocation and
rationing of national resources dedicated to health and medical care."). See generally
Kenneth Kipnis, Overwhelming Casualties: Medical Ethics in a Time of Terror, in IN THE
WAKE OF TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORALITY IN A TIME OF CRISIS 95 (Jonathan D. Moreno
ed., 2003).
115. Childress, supra note 54, at 78.
116.
JOHN F. KILNER,
SELECTION, at xi (1990).

117.

WHO LIVES?

WHO DIES?

Marshall & Perlmutter, supra note 59, at 34.

ETHICAL CRITERIA IN PATIENT
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IV. PREPARING FOR THE ASIAN BIRD FLU PANDEMIC

A. Limited Resources
It is feared that within a relatively short period of time, the avian flu
H5N1 virus will mutate into a form which will pass easily among persons
throughout the world, thereby triggering a pandemic. 1 8 This, in turn, will
create a public health crisis which will be focused, in very large measure,
on the distribution of scarce medical resources.
An integral part of any strategy designed to combat this crisis will be the
manufacture of an effective anti-viral vaccine. But, this vaccine cannot be
produced until the pandemic influenza strain emerges and is identified." 9
In the meantime, prior to the production of the vaccine, the World Health
Organization recommends that the anti-viral medication, Tamiflu, be
prescribed.1 20 The United States stockpiles Tamiflu treatment courses for
eighty-one million people.1 2' Rather than treat only those clinically
affected with the virus, present plans call for the delivery of anti-viral drugs
to those within an identified or specific area of infection. 22 As of July
2008, the estimated population of the United States was 303,824,640.123
Estimates have been made that if an influenza pandemic were to occur,
much as one did throughout the globe in 1918-1920, some sixty-two million
people, today, would succumb and die' 4 -with ninety-six percent of these
deaths occurring among developing countries. 125 Thirty-eight to eightynine million people in the United States would become clinically ill;
eighteen to forty-two million would require outpatient care; 314,000 to

118.

Michelle A. Daubert, Comment, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine:

Protecting Liberty Through a Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1299,
1300 n.2 (2007).
119. Andrew C. Singer et al., PotentialRisks Associated with the Proposed Widespread
Use ofTamflu, 115 ENVT'L HEALTH PERSP. 102, 102 (2007).
120. Id.; cf N. Pieter 0' Leary, Combating Nature's Insurgency: Tamiflu and
Vaccination in the Fight Against Avian Influenza, 10 J. MED. & L. 469 (2006) (reporting on

the fact that there is a very limited number of vaccine manufacturers today and only one in
the United States).
121. Singer et al., supra note 119, at 102.
122. Id. The United States and WHO have an additional five to six million courses of
Tamiflu for blanketing in specific regions once a confirmed outbreak occurs. Id.
123. THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2008), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html.
124.

Christopher J. L. Murray et al., Estimation of Potential Global Pandemic Influenza

Mortality on the Basis of Vital Registry Datafrom the 1918-20 Pandemic: A Quantitative
Analysis, 368 THE LANCET 2211, 2211 (2006).
125. Id.
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734,000 people would be hospitalized
and 89,000 to 207,000 people of the
12 6
U.S. population would die.
B. A Pandemic Strategyfor the United States
On November 1, 2005, President Bush released The National Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza, the purpose of which is to guide the preparedness
and response of the Nation to an influenza pandemic. 27 President Bush's
pandemic strategy recognizes that vaccines and antiviral medications are
available in limited supply. 128 The strategy sets out distribution protocols
for these countermeasures. 129 The Administration plans to develop
distribution mechanisms for antivirals and vaccines prior to and during a
pandemic. 130 Another goal is to prioritize the allocation of vaccines and
antivirals before an outbreak and update the prioritization when the
pandemic arrives based on the knowledge of at-risk
populations, supplies,
131
outbreak.
the
of
time
the
at
characteristics
and viral
The following day, November 2, 2005, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) released The Pandemic Influenza Plan (HHS
Plan).3 2 HHS is the "United States Government's principal agency for
protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human
services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves.' ' 33 The
126. Senator William Frist, Speech at the National Press Club, Pandemic: The
Economy's Silent Killer (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.volpac.org/
index.cfm?FuseAction=News.Speeches&ID=21 (quoting statistics from the Centers for
Disease Control & Prevention); see also HHS PLAN, supra note 34; Singer et al., supra note
119; Murray et al., supra note 124, at 2214; ef Serafini infra note 137, at 3258 and
accompanying text (reporting that the economic impact of a pandemic to the Nation would
be range from $87 billion to $203 billion).
127. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33. See generally Alfred J. Sciarrino, The
Grapes of Wrath and the Speckled Monster, Part III. Epidemics, Natural Disasters and
Biological Terrorism-the Federal Response, 10 J. MED. & L. 429 (2006) (discussing
historical governmental responses to epidemics with the use of compulsory vaccination and
quarantine).
128. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33, at 5.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 6; see also Christopher Lee, U.S. Flu OutbreakPlan Criticized, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2008, at A3 (reporting on how anticipated consequences of a mild or serious flu
outbreak would overwhelm medical centers, cause delays in emergency and routine care,
and also impede the distribution of antiviral vaccines; thereby concluding that an infusion of
billing must be made by Congress if a disease containment strategy is to be viable);
Hoffman, supra note 27, at 1925 (recognizing the liability risk to vaccine producers and
other medical suppliers during an emergency which would require them to produce the
vaccine at accelerated rates).
132. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Releases Pandemic
Influenza Plan: Plan Provides Guidance to Prepare Nation's Health Care System for a
Pandemic (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20051102.html.
133. HHS.gov, HHS: What We Do, http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last
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two main goals of the HHS Plan are to decrease the health impacts of the
pandemic such as morbidity and mortality and to minimize the societal and
economic impacts, thus providing
a plan for guidance for state and local
134
response.
and
preparedness
In order to achieve these goals while working with limited resources,
HHS has incorporated the concept of triage in its framework by suggesting
priority groups of those who should receive the vaccines and antiviral
medications. 135 Minimizing morbidity and mortality rates requires a
conservation of those medical resources so they may be used to their full
potential and are not wasted. An important theme that has been running
through the decision-making process is that in order to limit the effects of a
pandemic on society, the essential functions must be preserved. 136 Beyond
health care costs, there will be significant social and economic impacts on
the nation. People will probably avoid areas where they are likely to be in
contact with many people, such as schools, malls, theaters, bars, and
stadiums; thereby imposing large costs on vendors, workers, suppliers, and
merchants. 137 When parents do not send their children to school, they will
likely stay home with the children resulting in absenteeism from their jobs,
thus decreasing productivity and affecting our economy. 138 Trade and
transport of goods, foods, and services, both internationally and
domestically, are likely to be halted. 139 Additionally, the tourism industry
will fall victim to public fear during an outbreak. 140 With the loss of jobs,
productivity, and fear pervading the lives of citizens, the social and
141
economic impact will be significant.
visited Nov. 12, 2008).
134. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33, at 3. The entire 396-page Pandemic
Influenza Plan is available online. HHS PLAN, supra note 34. Additionally, access is
available to U.S. Government information on the avian and pandemic flu, Homeland
Security Council issues, WHO releases, and ongoing updates to the National Strategy for the
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan One Year Summary, via PandemicFlu.gov. The
World Health Organization also provides a listing of its guidelines online. World Health
Organization, WHO Guidelines on the Use of Vaccines and Antivirals During Influenza
Pandemics 4 (2004), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/ll 29 01
A.pdf. The American Public Health Association has, as well, a comprehensive listing and
discussion of health work force issues available at http://www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/
APHA+Prescription+for+Pandemic+flu.htm.
135. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33, at 5-6.
136. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-10.
137. Marilyn Werber Serafini, The Big One?, 37 NAT'L J. 3258, 3260 (2005).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Marilyn Werber Serafini, Short on Supplies-and Nurses, 37 NAT'L J. 3264,
3264 (2005). A recent study confirmed that nonpharmaceutical interventions used by fortythree cities during the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic had a salutary effect on the management
of the emergency. Howard Markel et al., NonpharmaceuticalInterventions Implemented by
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The HHS Plan provides guidance to state, local, and tribal groups for
implementing plans that: define priority groups by their functions to
maintain social continuity; develop a plans to identify individuals within
these groups, and; establish effective and equitable distributive methods of
vaccines and antivirals to these populations.142 States and localities are in a
better position than the federal government to identify the critical functions
that must be maintained to preserve the services and infrastructure, and
those individuals essential to achieve that goal. 143 Though it cannot provide
much tactical aid to each community, the federal government, through
HHS, is striving to "mitigate the severity of a pandemic by setting standards
the
for pandemic care, and by helping local officials understand
144
circumstances under which they should take dramatic action."'
US Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic, 298 JAMA 644, 644 (2007). The
cities that followed these interventions by closing schools, banning public gatherings,
isolating flu patients and placing in quarantine people exposed to them, suffered less than the
cities that chose not to enforce these measures. Id. at 654.
142. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D- 11; see also Lee, supra note 131. See
generally David Brown, If BioterroristsStrike, Letter CarriersMight Deliver Antibiotics,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2008, at A2 (detailing a plan being developed by the HHS which would
build upon the federally-funded Cities Readiness Initiative designed to assist some seventytwo major urban areas in developing strategies to distribute drugs to these target populations
within forty-eight hours of bioterrorist attacks, by providing for the delivery of antibiotics
necessary to combat an exposure to anthrax by volunteer letter carriers who might be
accompanied by city police officers and who, themselves, would be screened medically,
fitted with N95 face masks as well as being issued an appropriate antibiotic for their own
family households).
143. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & THE CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, INTERIM PRE-PANDEMIC PLANNING GUIDANCE: COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES-EARLY, TARGETED, LAYERED
USE OF NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS (2007), http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/

community/community-jmitigation.pdf. In February 2007, HHS and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) released new guidance on community planning strategies
which focus on self-quarantine of ill persons at their homes and away from work
environments for seven to ten days; home confinement for household members of ill patients
for seven days; a cessation of schools and child care programs for upwards of three months
and social distancing of adults in the community and at work. Id. at 37-40. Interestingly,
these guidelines complement many of the same practices which were followed during the
1918 flu epidemic. See David Brown, 1918 Flu Epidemic Teaching Valuable Lessons;
Actions Taken Apparently Were Effective, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2006, at A4.
144. Shane Harris, Every Community for Itself, 37 NAT'L J. 3265 (2005). See also HHS
PLAN, supra note 34, at pt. 1; Mary Beth Sheridan, Area Told It Needs to 'Do More' to
Preparefor Flu Epidemic, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2007, at B3. The story described testimony
at a congressional hearing by public officials from Virginia and the District of Columbia
who urged greater federal cooperation in planning for a pandemic flu outbreak, and
especially the delivery of critical medications to key employees in order to assure the
continued operation of government. The District of Columbia has stockpiled only some
45,000 courses of antiviral medication to combat the anticipated pandemic. Id.
A Report by The Commission on The National Guard and Reserves on the readiness of
these two branches of service to respond to assaults on the homeland from domestic attacks,
incidents by bioterrorism and catastrophes, was issued February 1,2008. Ann Scott Tyson,

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 18

Because much is unknown about when the pandemic will occur, what
form the influenza virus causing the pandemic will take, and the uncertainty
of the impact of a pandemic, assumptions must be made to create a
workable plan for distributing vaccines and antiviral medications based on
triage principles and humanism.
HHS has outlined its decisional
framework in determining priority groups for resource allocation following
consideration of five major factors. 145 First, those most likely to become
infected and die from the influenza virus must be considered. 146 Second,
the health care system will experience a "surge" of patients requiring
hospitalization and care into their facilities, possibly overwhelming the
system. 147 Third, the workforce will suffer from the increased absenteeism
due to illness, fear of becoming infected, and caring for ill family
members. 148
Fourth, there will be potential impacts on critical
infrastructure such as transportation, since people will not want to travel
with others out of fear of infection, as well as utility services to maintain
continuity and safe, sanitary, and healthy conditions. 149 Finally, a realistic
level of understanding needs to be shown regarding the inherent market
150
limitations imposed upon the production capacity for vaccines.
'Appalling Gap' Found in Homeland Defense Readiness, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2008, at A4.
In March, 2007, the Commission found eighty-eight percent of the Army and National
Guard was neither ready nor fully operational for national emergencies. Id. Greater funding
to train and equip the military's 836,000 selected reserves in order to assure that they can
operate interchangeably with active duty personnel is, the Commission concluded, needed
immediately. Id. The Commission also recommended that the Pentagon be charged with
providing the bulk of support to civilian authorities in the likely that event local responders
will be overwhelmed by a major catastrophe. Id. Furthermore, it was suggested that state
governors be allowed to command federal troops during times of national emergencies. Id.
145. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-13.
146. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE Epic STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PLAGUE IN HISTORY 4 (2004); see also HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-12. In
the 1918 pandemic, most deaths, surprisingly, occurred in young adults. Id. In the 1957 and
1968 pandemics, as well as the annual flu, infants, the elderly and the unhealthy are the most
at risk. Id. Because of the uncertainty of the form of the virus, a distributive plan must be
flexible enough to adjust as the epidemiology of the pandemic virus is discovered. Id. at D19. The problem is that the human-to-human infectious version of the virus does not yet
exist, and it is therefore uncertain as to which age groups will be most victimized by this
influenza virus. See id.
147. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-12. The CDC estimates that the
demand for hospitalization will increase twenty-five percent even in a moderate pandemic.
Id. See also Serafini, supra note 141, at 3259, 3264; Lee, supra note 131, at A3.
148. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-12. The CDC estimates that ten
percent of the work force will be absent during a pandemic. Id. See also Serafini, supra
note 137, at 3260.
149. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-12. See also Serafini, supra note
137, at 3260.
150. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-12. The HHS has assumed that the
U.S. can produce three to five million doses per week of the vaccine; however, it will take
three to six months before the first dose can be produced once the virus is detected. Id.
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C. Triage of Vaccine Distribution

The priority group recommendations of HHS appear to seek to do the
greatest good for the most people while attempting to minimize the burden
on the health care resources. 15' At the outbreak of a pandemic, those of top
priority (Tier 1) under the HHS Plan to receive vaccinations are the vaccine
15 2
and antiviral manufacturers and those essential to their production.
Production of vaccines and antiviral drugs will provide for the common
good in a pandemic. Next on the priority list are the medical and public
health workers in direct patient contact, others responsible for direct patient
care, and vaccinators. 153 This will be necessary to help hospitals deal with
the "surge" of ill people as well as limit the potential that healthcare
personnel will not come to work out of fear of getting infected. 154 The
health care facilities will need "all hands on deck" to deal with the
hospitalizations potentially resulting from a pandemic. The selection of
these groups as top priority to receive vaccinations is based on one of the
utilitarian principles of triage-general social value. 155 The principle as
applied to this situation shows that these manufacturers and medical and
public health workers are "believed to have the greatest actual or potential
general social worth."' 15 6 Because the scarcest resources in a pandemic will
be vaccinations, antiviral medications, and health care workers, it is
imperative that the production of these countermeasures continue, and that
heath care workers are available and healthy to treat ill patients.
The HHS Plan seeks to save the most lives, as well as protect the health
care resources during a surge into the hospitals. After the vaccine and
antiviral manufacturers, and the public health workers, HHS seeks to
protect those persons from six months of age with influenza, those with
high-risk conditions, and those with a history of pneumonia and influenza
hospitalizations. 157 The goal here is to identify and protect those most
susceptible and most likely to be hospitalized or die from influenza, thereby
Also, two doses per person are required to protect against the H5N 1 virus. Id. See also Neil
Munro, Don't Count on a Vaccine, 37 NAT'L J. 3261, 3261 (Oct. 22, 2005).
151. See HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-13.

152.

Id. See generally Gary R. Noble, The Promise of Vaccines and the Influenza

Vaccine Shortage of 2004: Public and Private Partnerships, in ETHICS AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 352 (Michael A. Santoro & Thomas Gorrie eds., 2005)

(explaining the demands on the pharmaceutical industry).
153. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, at D-13. See generally Adrian A. Maung & Susan M.
Briggs, DisasterPlanning, in THE TRAUMA HANDBOOK OF THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL

HOSPITAL 58, 58-60 (Robert L. Sheridan ed., 2004) (emphasizing the important role of
medical personnel in the functioning of triage during a crisis).
154.

See HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-12-13.

155.

Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 146.

156.
157.

Id.
HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-13.
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making hospital resources available to those who are most likely to recover
with treatment.1 58 By vaccinating those identified to be most susceptible to
influenza, the government is using triage principles because it is
immediately useful to those patients, and it seeks to conserve antivirals and
other health care resources for those less likely to be infected by
influenza. 159 In a further effort to conserve vaccine resources, the elderly in
nursing homes and those with compromised immune systems are excluded
from vaccination because it is unlikely that the vaccine would have a
protective effect on such individuals. 60 Also, under another triage
principle, vaccinating these individuals will have the lowest possibility of
medical success and, therefore, it would be futile and a potential waste of
limited resources that could be used for a patient that will benefit from the
vaccination. 61 The goal of vaccination is to help those who will most
benefit from a vaccine and not those who are unlikely to benefit.
The HHS Plan does provide for the vaccination of those who are in
regular contact with individuals with compromised immune systems. 62
Pregnant women are in a high priority group of those vaccinated because it
was observed from past pandemics that pregnant women were at high risk,
63
and that vaccinations will also protect infants who cannot be vaccinated.
Since children less than six months of age cannot be vaccinated, those in
household contact with children of that age are to be vaccinated. 64 In
prioritizing these groups of individuals, the triage system is fulfilling the
parent role principle because both the caretakers and pregnant women have
others who are dependent upon them for survival. 165 It would therefore be
in the best interests of the community to allow for those individuals to
continue caring for their dependents so as to conserve the resource of the
health care system. Finally, public health officials are playing a critical role
in the pandemic response; thus key government leaders making decisions
and implementing the response are to be vaccinated to maintain its
66
continuity. 1
Tier 2 protects healthy individuals aged sixty-five and older, healthy
infants aged six to twenty-three months and those six months old to sixty-

158. Id; see also Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 146.
159. Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 146.
160. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-13.
161. Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 146.
162. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-13.
163. Id. See generally, Symposium, supra note 22.
164. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-13.
165. Smith, Endgame Realities, supra note 32, at 146.
166. HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-13. The social worth of these
leaders' works to society and in promotion of the common good, during a pandemic is
potentially great-thus they have been listed on the priority list. Id.
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four years old with high-risk conditions of influenza. 167 These groups are at
less of an increased risk than those in Tier 1; nevertheless, they are still at a
high risk for influenza. 168 Here, the HHS Plan continues to try to solve the
problem of the scarcity of health care resources by providing these highrisk groups with preventative vaccination. 169 Hopefully, it will eliminate
the need for future treatment in hospitals by conserving the resources for
others.17 0
Included in this Tier are other public health emergency
responders, public safety workers (police, fire, 911 dispatchers and
correctional facility staff), utility workers (power, water, and sewage),
transportation workers (fuel, water, food, and medical supplies), and
telecommunications workers. 171
These workers are important for
maintaining the continuity of societal functions and critical infrastructure,
and thus are valued contributors to society. 172 Here, the HHS Plan is
providing a federal guideline for the states, which the states must modify to
suit the needs of their communities and citizens. 73 In order for a state to
determine effectively which social functions are essential, the affected
populations in the community must be encouraged to cooperate, so that
state officials may understand the values and priorities of the affected
communities. 174 However, when a state or locality develops a plan to
maintain the social order in a time of crisis, it is important that the public is
encouraged to cooperate and participate in its development so the public
perceives the triage standards as fair. 175 When the public is regarded as a
partner and an ally in the planning effort, public confidence and trust in the
process is established. 76 When the public understands the rationale and has
participated in the process by contributing their values and priorities, social
disruption will be minimized during the pandemic. 1 77 Prior to a health
emergency, the government must maintain the public's trust, and achieving
this trust will be more likely if the public "participate[s] in setting [the]
procedures and material criteria and ...in determining what to emphasize

167.

Id. at D-14.

168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id. at D-12.

171.

HHS

172.

Id.

KILNER, supranote 116, at
PLAN,

11.

supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-14.

173. Id. atD-11.
174. Childress, supra note 54, at 89.
175. Id. at 88-89.
176. Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to
Vaccinate a City Against Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217 (2002) ("Failure to
involve the public as a key partner in the medical and public-health response could hamper
effective management of an epidemic and increase the likelihood of social disruption.").
177. Childress, supra note 54, at 89.
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in medical utility, which
functions and roles are essential in judgments of
178
narrow social utility.'
Tier 3 includes other government decision makers, funeral directors and
embalmers.179 However, the priority given to funeral directors and
embalmers is a value judgment that members of the public must consider in
their communities. 180 In the federal strategy, funeral directors and
embalmers are seen as lower-priority individuals, however, with the
anticipated mortality rate of the H5Nl virus being so significant, mortuaries
are likely to also experience "surge" of the dead if the virus remains this
virulent.' 81 The jobs of the embalmers and funeral directors who will be in
close contact with increasing numbers of dead bodies will become all the
more important for society. Families would like to provide their loved ones
with a proper funeral. The position of the embalmers and funeral director
on the priority list of vaccinations should be reconsidered when
implemented by the states.
In 1918, "the most terrifying aspects of the epidemic was the piling up of
bodies."' 82 The undertakers, responsible for the bodies, were sick and
overwhelmed. 83 There was nowhere to put the bodies. 84 Gravediggers
were also sick or refused to bury influenza victims out of fear of getting
sick. 185 The bodies could not be buried because there were no
87
gravediggers. 186 Bodies piled up because they could not be buried.
Coffins ran out.' 88 The morgues could not accommodate all the bodies that
were brought in, so bodies remained in the homes where they died, and
some even put their loved ones on ice--creating unsanitary conditions to
say the least. 89 People were dying so quickly that there was no way to
accommodate the bodies.' 90 Learning from the past, it would be helpful to
make those that deal with the dead a higher vaccination priority than under
the current plan.
Finally, Tier 4 requires the vaccination of healthy persons between the
ages of two and sixty-four years who are not included in the other
178.
179.
180.
specific
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 91.
HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-14.
See id. at D- 11 (acknowledging that communities have specific needs and that
composition of priority groups thus necessarily differs).
HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-14. See also Singer, supra note 119.
BARRY, supra note 146, at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BARRY, supra note 146, at 223.
Id. at 223-24.
See id.
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categories.191

Those who request a vaccination would be provided with

one. 192

This plan assumes that H5Nl will not affect the young, twenty-to
forty-year-olds, as occurred with the 1918 virus.1 93 There, the death curves
were not like those of usual influenza; instead, they were "W-shaped" with
deaths occurring in children under age five, elderly between the ages of
seventy and seventy-four, and those between the ages of twenty and
forty. 194 Therefore, a supplemental plan must be developed if the virus
shows to be one of the epidemiology of the 1918 pandemic. Vaccinations
of those aged twenty to forty must be of a much higher priority, as the
supplemental plan affects more people than those at the other peaks of the
younger and the older.
D. Triage ofAntiviral Medications
The priority groups for those being treated with antiviral medications are
typically those most at risk of becoming infected with influenza and would
create the greatest burden on the health care system and its critical
infrastructure. 195 A system of triage in the hospital when patients come in
for treatment is designed to make the most efficient use of the antiviral
medications and health care system resources. 196 According to the HHS
Plan, those groups of first priority are the patients admitted to hospitals
with serious illness and high risk of death. 197 This brings in an egalitarian
alternative to the triage principle by giving priority on the basis of general
neediness-those at the top of the list are the most helpless and the most ill.
Second in priority are the health care workers and emergency medical
service providers who are in direct contact with patients. 198 Health care
workers are a limited resource, and during a pandemic, health care
personnel will be in great demand to treat those affected by the influenza
virus. These health care providers, because of their limited availability,
have great social worth during a successful pandemic response.
Antiviral medications are then distributed to those outpatient groups at
highest risk of hospitalization and death, as well as those for whom
vaccines are ineffective because their immune systems are significantly
compromised. 199 Next, antiviral medications will be administered to health
191.
192.

HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-14.

Id.

193.
GINA KOLATA, FLU: THE STORY OF THE GREAT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918 AND
THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT 5 (1999).

194.

Id. at 4-5.

195.

HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-21.

196.
197.

Marshall & Perlmutter, supra note 59, at 159.
HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-21.

198.
199

Id.
Id

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 18

responders, public safety officials, and government decision-makers to
ensure that the pandemic health response continues effectively. 200 The fifth
priority group includes those outpatients at increased risk: young children,
those over sixty-five years of age, and people with medical conditions.20 '
The final five priorities include those who are not going to be vaccinated,
such as those in nursing homes with compromised immune systems, other
health care workers necessary to the health care response, those necessary
to prevent absenteeism, and societal responders to implement the pandemic
response are to be provided with antiviral medications.20 2 The last three on
the priority list are those outpatients and health care workers not included
on the list above.20 3 Again, however, those aged twenty to forty are
excluded from the top priority groups because of their strong immune
204 However, during the 1918 virus, the strength of the immune
systems. 20
response itself was the killer, and not the virus, in those aged twenty to
forty.20 5 Those aged twenty to forty with healthy immune systems were the
most severely attacked during the 1918 pandemic, 20 6 but they are last on the
priority distribution list of countermeasures to the virus in the current
plan.20 7 Those within that age group seeking to protect themselves from the
virus in the prime of their lives will have to sacrifice their personal
autonomy to medical treatment for others in the community.
The HHS Plan recommendations take into great consideration the limited
supply of medications that would be available in a pandemic, as well as the
strain on healthcare systems when patients flood the hospitals. One goal of
the plan is to target vaccination toward groups that are most susceptible to
illness to keep those individuals out of hospitals.2 °8 In the event that those
who are less susceptible to the virus fall ill and come to the hospital, there
will be beds, nurses, antiviral medications, and other medical necessities
available to them. Also, those individuals with compromised immune
systems not likely to be protected by a vaccine will not be provided one,
because vaccinating those individuals would be futile and others who may
209
benefit from the vaccination would not receive one.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.

202.
203.

Id.
HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-21.
See id; cf BARRY, supra note 146, at 247.

204.
205. BARRY, supra note 146, at 247.
206. Id.
207. See HHS PLAN, supra note 34, pt. 1, app. D, at D-14, D-21.
208. Id. at pt. 1,app. D, at D-12 to -15, pt. 2, supp. 7, at S7-11.
209. See generally George P. Smith, II, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility:
SafeguardingAutonomy and the ProhibitionAgainst Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 7, 15 (1995) (explaining the principle of fitility in a
medical context with associated moral implications).
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E. Implementation Plan Update
On July 17, 2007, the government issued an update 210 on the Pandemic
Influenza Implementation Plan originally released on November 1, 2005.211
This new assessment of progress shows-rather strikingly-the weakness
in the federal government's ability to both detect an outbreak of the flu or to
even track the progress of it as it moves throughout the country.212 The
federal government is developing, as well, a nationwide surveillance system
able to track the directions of the pandemic as it moves throughout the
world, but it is not yet operational. 3 Having concluded that sealing the
Nation's borders in the event of an influenza pandemic will be impractical,
since it will enter the country regardless of physical restrictions at border
crossings, the government has nevertheless underscored its intent to limit
the entry of individuals who might be infected or who would be considered
14
suspects of carrying the virus.2
Over time, the government will refine the priority list for individuals
who will receive the flu vaccine first when an outbreak occurs and-as
well-will develop more fully and then release plans for coordinated school
210.

See

HOMELAND

SECURITY

COUNCIL,

NATIONAL

STRATEGY

FOR

PANDEMIC

INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN ONE YEAR SUMMARY 1 (2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi-oneyear.pdf [hereinafter ONE YEAR SUMMARY];
see also Gardiner Harris, Limited Capacity is Seen in Flu Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2007, at A14 (assessing the still limited capacity of the federal government to combat a
pandemic influenza outbreak).
On September 10, 2007, the federal government released a draft National Response
Framework (NRF) designed to establish a national approach to catastrophic incidents and, as
such, serve as a blueprint for dealing with terrorist attacks and other disasters. Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Draft National Response
Framework Released for Public Comment (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/
releases/pr_ 189450382144.shtm; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE
FRAMEWORK (Draft) (Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/
ContentViewer?objectld=090000648028412b&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
[hereinafter FRAMEWORK (Draft)]. Initial criticism of the draft has been that it provides
insufficient detail for guidance by local officials charged with managing specific incidents,
and-furthermore-is unclear as to levels of accountability and supervision in the chain of
command. Spencer S. Hsu, ProposedDisaster-ReliefPlan Faulted,WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2007, at A4. For the present, the NRF will seek-through fifteen federally designated
disaster scenarios-to develop separate strategic plans for disaster relief FRAMEWORK
(Draft), supra at 2-3; see also Hsu, supra; cf Bill Walsh, FEMA Gets Mixed Grades:
Homeland Security Assesses Preparedness,TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), Apr. 4, 2008,
National at 6 (reviewing FEMA's uneven performance record in preparing for another postKatrina type disaster, concluding the Agency is simply not prepared to deal with a
catastrophe of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, and further concluding that the Agency is
especially vulnerable in its ability to track whether its orders, once given, are implemented);
infra note 215 (commenting on the finalization of the draft framework).
211.
212.

NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33.
ONE YEAR SUMMARY, supra note 210.

213.
214.

Id.
Harris, supra note 210, at A16; see also id.
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closings between state and local governments. 215 Additional concern has
been raised regarding the present capacity for all healthcare facilities to
manage effectively the additional patient burdens arising from the influenza
disease.2 16
While the federal government has dedicated capital investments of $1
billion to develop new ways to manufacture flu vaccines, HHS has released
additional sums to include $897 million to state governments for emergency
preparedness, of which $175 million is set aside specifically for the
pandemic.217
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this update is that while the
federal government is making progress in preparing the Nation for an
influenza pandemic, considerable work must be undertaken before all levels
of government-national, state, and municipal-will be able to make a
coordinated response to the pandemic. In developing effective emergency
planning and preparedness an all hazards approach must be developedone which, of necessity, includes not only pandemic influenza strategies,
but also those for the emergence of new diseases, terrorist attacks, and
natural disasters. Accordingly, preparing for a pandemic must not be taken

215. See ONE YEAR SUMMARY, supra note 210, at 3; Harris, supra note 210; see also
Spencer S. Hsu, States Feel Left Out of DisasterPlanning,WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2007, at Al
(reporting as to the Nation's overall response to disaster planning that state and local
officials charged with emergency management are concerned that the federal government is
acting unilaterally and emphasizing responses to terrorism at the cost of neglecting
safeguards against natural disasters); Eileen Sullivan, Disaster Response Coordination
Positions Bypass FEMA, CQ HOMELAND SEC., July 23, 2007, http://public.cq.com/docs/hs/
hsnews 110-000002556714.html (commenting on how the National Protection and Programs
Directorate, within the Department of Homeland Security, is now the states' contact for
disaster preparedness-not FEMA).
On January 22, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security announced a new, final
framework for managing domestic incidents which exceed or are anticipated to exceed state
resources or when an incident is managed by federal departments directly and declared to be
Incidents of National Significance. See generally Spencer S. Hsu, DHS to Unveil New
Disaster Response Plan; FEMA Will Regain Power; State, Local Input Included, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2008, at A3. This National Response Framework is seen as a direct response
to the previous concerns of state and local units of government regarding their level of
participation in disasters which require a unified "all-hazards response." Id. Consequently,
FEMA's power is restored, and it therefore has the delegated responsibility to clarify and
coordinate heretofore diffuse any confusing levels of responsibility among the states and
their municipalities. Id. This Framework document is required by, and integrates under, the
larger National Strategy for Homeland Security. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL
RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 12 (2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrfcore.pdf. It supersedes the corresponding sections of the National Response Plan (2004,
with 2006 revisions). Id. at i. Updates and amendments to the Framework and its various
specific indexes are to be posted at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/NRF as made available.
Id. at 1.
216. ONE YEAR SUMMARY, supra note 210, at 4; see also Harris, supra note 210.
217. Harris, supra note 210; see also ONE YEAR SUMMARY, supra note 210, at 16.
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as a threat to or competition with other efforts directed at disaster
preparedness.
V. LAW REFORM THROUGH MODEL LEGISLATION

A majority of state statutes dealing with public care and, specifically,
isolation and quarantine, were enacted a number of years, if not decades
ago.218 In order to allow the states to come into the new age of bioterrorism
and public health emergencies, in 2003, the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) urged them to amend or enact new legislation
appropriate to effectuating this goal.219 In order to "jump start" this
updating process, the NAAG brought forward two model proposals-the
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 220 and the Turning Point Model
State Public Health Act.22 1 Particular care was placed on redefining due
process rights in relation to cases where isolation and/or quarantine are
ordered.222
The work product of the Center for Law and the Public's Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities in collaboration with the
Centers for Disease Control, the MSEHPA arose as a consequence of the
attacks by bioterrorists on New York City on September 11, 2001, and the
subsequent realization that "a coordinated, appropriate response in the event
of a public health emergency" was lacking. 223 In granting to both state
governors and public health officers a wide array of specific emergency
powers, the MSEHPA also seeks to strike a balance between their powers
224
and the personal liberties and civil rights of the medical detainees.
Testifying to the "catalystic" effect of this model legislation, by August,
2003, some thirty-four states and the District of Columbia had introduced
legislation which either included provisions of the MSEHPA or adoptions
from it. 225 By July, 2006, the number of states subscribing to the model act

had risen to thirty-eight.226
218.

Daubert, supra note 118, at 1336.

219. Id; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., Resolution: Urging States to Review
Their Public Health Laws (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
Resources/ResourcesPDFs/PHL%20NAAG.pdf
220. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT pmbl. at 6 (Ctr. for Law & the

Public's Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., Proposed Official Draft 2001),
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PuB. HEALTH ACT intro. 1-2, prefatory nn. 3 (Pub.
221.

Health Stat. Modernization Nat'l Excellence Collaborative 2003), http://www.hss.state.ak.us/
dph/improving/turningpoint/PDFs/MSPHAweb.pdf.

222. Daubert, supra note 118, at 1336-37.
223. Id. at 1337.
224. Id. at 1337-41.
225. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Planningfor and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases,
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Public health law reform opportunities were enhanced, as well, by the
completion of a collaborative work product undertaken by nine national
organizations and government agencies, representatives from five states,
and the Public Health Statute Modernization collaborative. Termed the
Turning Point Act, this legislative model structures a framework by which
states can measure their preparedness for public health emergencies.2
By
March, 2007, some thirty-three states had-to one degree or anotheradopted features of this proposed model legislation. 2 9
While the two Acts overlap, there are two central and important
differences to be found regarding due process rights during an isolation or
quarantine.23 ° When either isolation or quarantine is ordered (with notice)
under the MSEHPA, a hearing must be held within a five-day period-with
a ten-day maximum time being allowed for extraordinary and good
cause. 231 Under the Turning Point Act, however, detainment hearings must
be conducted upon the filing of the petition, within a forty-eight hour
period, or within five days under extraordinary circumstances, and for good
cause as determined by the discretion of the court.232
Regarding the evidentiary burden to be met under confinement by
isolation or quarantine, MSEHPA directs the judiciary to grant any petition
made when by "a preponderance of the evidence" it is determined that
either of these two acts of confinement is reasonably necessary to limit or
prevent "transmission of a contagious or possibly contagious disease. 33
Under the Turning Point Act, the court shall grant a petition if "clear and
convincing evidence" is presented.2 34 Overall, greater protection of
288 JAMA 622, (2002); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act: Public Health and Civil Liberties in Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3,
5 (2003).
226. Daubert, supra note 118, at 1337; THE CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.'S HEALTH AT
GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA) State Legislative Activity, 1 (2006), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/
MSEHPA%20Leg%20Activity.pdf (listing updates and comparisons of the state enactments
of MSEHPA).
227. Daubert, supra note 118, at 1337.
228. See M. Jane Brady et al., How States Are Using the Turning Point Model State
Public Health Act, 33 J.L. MED. &ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPP.) 97, 98-99 (2004).
229. The Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., The
Turning Point Model State Public Health Act State Legislative Update Table 1, 1 (2007),
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/MSPHA%20LegisTrack.pdf.
230. Daubert, supra note 118, at 1341.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id., quoting MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 605(b)(5) (Ctr. for
Law & the Public's Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., Proposed Official Draft

2001).
234.

Daubert, supra note 118, at 1341 quoting TURNING

POINT MODEL STATE PUB.
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individual liberties and rights is achieved under the Turning Point Actowing to the stricter due process requirements within its provisions.23 5
Although "tools of last resort," isolation and quarantine are effective
public health measures.236 When isolation is ordered, those individuals
diagnosed with a specific infectious illness are separated from association
with healthy individuals in an attempt to block the spread of the illness.2 37
Quarantine may be defined as "the separation and restriction of movement
of persons who, while not yet ill, have been exposed to an infectious agent
and therefore may become infectious., 238 Absent punishment for a crime,
involuntary detention must always be about establishing a justifiable
balancing point that, while acknowledging the state's duty in protecting and
safeguarding the health and safety of the public, also is both sensitive and
reasonable as to the liberty interests and due process rights of the individual
detained.23 9
Other concerns and criticisms of MSEHPA are tied to a number of
issues: the extraordinarily broad discretionary powers of a governor to
declare, unilaterally, without consultation with public health officials, a
state of public health emergency. 240 The conditions under which the
declaration is made are not spelled out by usage of words such as
"significant" and "substantial.

2 41

As well, the expanded police powers

granted to state and local governments are worrisome to those who fear
misuse. 242 Additionally, some critics express concerns over provisions in
MSEHPA which force vaccination, treatment or quarantine upon
individuals; allow the state to track and share the personal health
information of citizens without their consent; and mobilize state militias to
enforce and penalize those who disobey state orders.243
HEALTH ACT § 5-108(e)(4) (Pub. Health Stat. Modernization Nat'l Excellence Collaborative

2003).
235. Daubert, supra note 118, at 1342.
236. Id. at 1299. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic
Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public's Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 171-74 (2007).
237. Daubert, supra note 118, at 1301.
238. Id. at 1301-02.
239. Id. at 1328-29. For a recent application of isolation and quarantine, see David
Brown, Man with Rare TB Detained, Isolated: He Ignored Orders, Traveled Extensively,
WASH. POST, May 30, 2007, at A3; Man QuarantinedAfter Flying Across Atlantic with TB,
WASH. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at A3.
240. See Annas, NEwENG. J. MED., supra note 14, at 1338-39.
241. Lorena Matei, Case Note, QuarantineRevision and The Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act: "Laws for the Common Good," 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 433, 438 (2002); see also Annas, NEW ENG. J. MED., supra note 14, at 1340
(expressing concerns over the misuse of public health emergency measures).
242. See Matei, supra note 241 at 439-44; Annas, NEW ENG. J. MED., supra note 14, at
1340.
243. See Sue Blevins, President, Inst. for Health Freedom, Remarks at the 25th Annual
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For civil libertarians, a provision within MSEHPA that the government
will-in exercising its emergency powers-protect the civil rights and
liberties to the "fullest extent possible consistent with the primary goal of
controlling serious health threats" goes too far in its stated endeavors to
strike an appropriate "balance" between those actions taken, during
emergencies, to safeguard the common good and those actions which
respect the rights and liberties of citizenship.244 The drafters of this Act
contend that a right and proper balance between the execution of
compulsory powers during emergencies and the rights of personal dignity
has been maintained. 245 And, furthermore, they remind the naysayers that
free of a
there is no "right to be free of any restraint, but the right to be
246
particular restraint that is not justified under the circumstances.
Both of these legislative modes-MSEHPA and the Turning Point Actrather successfully, on balance, seek to facilitate the implementation of five
foundational functions of public health: preparedness (through public health
emergency planning); surveillance (by establishing measures to not only
detect, but track emergencies); management of property (by securing the
availability of vaccines, pharmaceuticals and hospitals); protection of
persons (by compelling, when clearly necessary, vaccinations, testing,
treatment, isolation and quarantine); 247 and communication (by ensuring
unambiguous and authoritative information reaches the public at large in a
timely manner).2 48 As such, both models provide that forum for debate
called for previously to re-evaluate, re-educate, and inform public opinion
249
to the evolving nature of the common good during these perilous times.
VI. CONCLUSION
For every fundamental right or civil liberty asserted, there is a coordinate
responsibility or even a correlative duty to realize, when directed by the
needs of the common good, that that right must be executed reasonably. A
synonym for reasonableness is cost-effectiveness attained, as such, by and
through a cost-benefit analysis. For purposes of this present analysis, the

Resource Bank Meeting: The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: An Assault on
Civil Liberties in the Name of Homeland Security (Jun. 10, 2002) (Heritage Lecture #748),
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standard of reasonableness is found, historically, within the tenets of the
principle of medical triage. It is then adopted properly by the Executive
and codified in the Pandemic Influenza Plan authored by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. 25 0 As well, the standard is set
once again within the provisions of MSEPHA 25 1 and the Turning Point
Act. 252 Either of these model statutes can serve as catalysts for law reform,
and therefore become templates for a new level of public health awareness
and repressiveness.
When executive actions or legislative schemes put forward to safeguard
the public in times of emergency and to preserve the common good are
tested in the courts for their legitimacy and constitutional efficacy, the
wisest course of action should be that of "judicial modesty. '253 Indeed, it
may be properly regarded as the "cornerstone of judicial interpretation of
the Constitution in emergency situations. 254 Instead of holding for
constitutional invalidity, the courts should decide the test case challenges
on narrow statutory grounds 255 and eschew consideration of the
"probabilistic" effects of restrictions on various civil liberties within the
"social landscape. 2 56
Endeavoring to find an accurate and fair point of equilibrium in
balancing competing values should dictate that the judiciary gives serious
attention to risks rather than being tied to certainties and rules. 257 This is
the case simply because the aim of most emergency measures is to reduce
risks and not to eliminate certainties.2 58 Therefore, standards, not rules,
must-perforce-shape the breadth of judicial review of the
constitutionality of security measures. 259 Standards are more flexible and
situational and allow for accommodation by balancing the costs versus the
benefits of each case in reaching a disposition.
Sadly, all too often civil liberties are seen as synonymous with
constitutional rights.260 These rights may be modified-indeed, should
be-when they, as rights, "no longer strike[] a sensible balance between
competing constitutional values, such as personal liberty and public
250. See HHS PLAN, supra note 34.
251. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law & the Public's
Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., Proposed Official Draft 2001).
252. See TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT (Pub. Health Stat.
Modernization Nat'l Excellence Collaborative 2003).
253.
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Id.
Id. at 34.
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See id. at 35.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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Id. at 149.
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safety. 26 1 National emergencies force disequilibrium in the system of
liberties and constitutional rights which have the effect of placing public
safety concerns above what, heretofore, were seen as unassailable
fundamental values.262 Pragmatic courts and pragmatic social orders, then,
must respond accordingly to these changed circumstances by recalibrating
what has been a point of balance or equilibrium by restricting previously
validated civil liberties in favor of safety 263 and maintenance of the
common good.264
As seen, the frameworks or mechanisms to ensure the recalibration of the
balancing test have been discussed and analyzed, namely the scope of the
common good; the principle of triage-grounded in the philosophy of
utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis; and the Pandemic Influenza Plan of
the federal government together with the MSEHPA and the Turning Point
Act. What remains is for the vox populi to be educated as to their
responsibilities of citizenship which demand-in times of national and
public health emergencies-that the common good be protected and
secured, and further, that this responsibility justifies the curtailment of basic
liberties and rights during the time of the emergency. The failure to
recognize or accept this responsibility courts the collapse of society itself.
The supersessive common good, or-in other words-the good seen as
overriding all members of a community or, here, the Nation-is surely
265 Put
security. 26
simply, without security, there can be no community. To
state it otherwise, security is the greatest good for the greatest number
within a given community.266 The attainment and guarantee of this good,
grounded in common sense, must always be preferred over an abridgement
or temporary suspension of civil liberties.267 Otherwise, the Constitution
268
will, indeed, become little more than "a suicide pact.,
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